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This paper considers a multi-player stag hunt where players are either available for 
action or not, and where players additionally differ in their degree of conservatism, 
i.e. in the threshold of players that need to act along with them before they see 
benefits in collective action. Minimal sufficient networks, which depending on their 
thresholds allow players to achieve just enough interactive knowledge about each 
other’s availability to act, take the form of hierarchies of cliques (Chwe, RES, 2000). 
We show that any typical threshold game has a plethora of such networks, so that 
players seem to face a large degree of strategic uncertainty over which network to 
use. The plethora of networks includes cases where the structure of the network 
infects players into acting more conservatively than is reflected in their thresholds. 
An extreme case of this is the core-periphery network, where each player acts as 
conservatively as the most conservative player in the population. Because of this 
feature, the core-periphery network is minimal sufficient for all possible populations. 
Players can thus solve the strategic uncertainty arising from the multiplicity of 
minimal sufficient networks by using the all-purpose core-periphery network. 
 
Keywords: Threshold Game, Common Knowledge, Network Formation, Collective 
Action. 
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The class of collective action problems known as stag hunt games (for an overview, see 
Skyrms, 2004) are characterized by  an “I’ll  go if  you  go” mechanism: if  you act (revolt 
against the government, use a new technological standard,…), so will I. Contrary to what is 
the case in the prisoner’s dilemma, both inaction and collective action are Nash equilibria. But 
given the large cost of acting alone, even the slightest doubt that others do not act can induce 
the individual player not to act. For this reason the stag hunt is also referred to as a trust 
dilemma.  In  the  two-player  stag  hunt,  each  player  only  acts  when  somehow  receiving 
assurance that the other player acts – for this reason this game is also known as the assurance 
game (Sen, 1967). In multi-player stag hunts (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993), players may 
moreover differ according to the number of people they want to act along with them before 
they find it worth to act, and may thus also differ according to the level of assurance that they 
require. Granovetter (1978) refers to a player’s threshold as the critical number of players that 
need to act for benefits of collective action to arise for him. For this reason, this type of 
collective action has also been referred to as a threshold game (Chwe, 1999, 2000). A radical, 
low-threshold player may act as soon as receiving assurance from even a single other player. 
A conservative, high-threshold player on the contrary will need assurance from many others. 
The player population may span all thresholds in between these extremes.  
In terms of the network literature (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1995; Bala and Goyal, 2000), a 
message by player i to player j by which player j finds out player i’s willingness to act can be 
seen  as  a  link  from  player  i  to  player  j.  The  question  arises  then:  what  sort  of  network 
structure needs to be established between the players for them to achieve collective action? 
Granovetter  (1978)  suggests  a  bandwagon  network,  in  which  players  order  themselves 
according  to  their  thresholds.  In  the  simplest  case,  there  is  one player  of  each  threshold, 
including a player who does not require assurance from anyone, namely a threshold-1 player. 
As this player is still better off the more other players act, the threshold-1 player assures the 
threshold-2 player of his willingness to act, after which the threshold-3 player is told about the 
willingness to act of the two first players, etc. Yet, as pointed out by Granovetter, such a 
bandwagon does not assure collective action for all populations. In fact, in an only slightly 
different population with the threshold-1 player turned into a threshold-2 player and all other 
players as before, any attempt to use the same bandwagon to achieve collective action leads to 
complete inaction. The former threshold-1 player no longer acts, because she would now like 
information from at least one other player. As she does not get such information, she cannot 
convince the threshold-2 player to act. Etc. Granovetter’s reason for providing this example is 
to show that one cannot simply talk of some type of “group intent”, where one considers a 
population as an entity, and where two very similar populations would then be expected to act 
in the same manner. An alternative interpretation, which we pursue in this paper, is that it 
would then be nice to have a general-purpose communication network, that works for any 
population. Unfortunately, Granovetter’s example suggests a different type of communication 
network  may  have  to  be  designed  for  each  individual  population,  where  even  two  only 
slightly different populations may require a different communication network. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that a general-purpose communication network, which 
works  for  any  population,  does  exist  across  different  threshold  games.  We  show  this  by 
treating a modified version of Chwe’s (2000) formal model of the threshold game. Just as in 
Chwe’s  original  model,  we  obtain  that  any  network  that  makes  all  players  act  (i.e.  is 
sufficient) and has no redundant links (i.e. is minimal) takes the form of a hierarchy of cliques. 
A clique is a subset of players who all talk to each other. Any minimal sufficient network   2 
partitions the players in cliques, and cliques talk to one another only in one direction.
1 A chain 
of  cliques  is  thus  obtained,  consisting  of  one  or  more  leading  cliques  of  radicals,  who 
communicate with cliques of somewhat less radical players, who again communicate with still 
less radical cliques, etc. While Chwe’s propositions do not imply such restrictions, in the 
examples of minimal sufficient networks that he provides, all players are connected in a single 
network, containing multi-player cliques. Each individual clique is homogeneous in grouping 
all players with the same threshold. Finally, players are ordered in the hierarchy of cliques 
according to their thresholds, in that higher threshold players are systematically at a lower 
rank in the hierarchy. 
Our first contribution is to show that for any population, contrary to the examples that Chwe 
provides, typically a plethora of minimal sufficient networks exists (this result is obtained 
both in Chwe’s original model, and in the modified version of it presented in this paper). 
These may not only include Granovetter-like bandwagon networks consisting only of one-
player cliques, but also networks containing as  few as two hierarchical ranks (one leader 
clique,  and  follower  cliques  depending  on  it),  networks  containing  multi-player  cliques 
consisting  of  players  with  different  thresholds  (heterogeneous  cliques),  networks  where 
inherently  more  radical  players  are  at  a  lower  hierarchical  rank  than  more  conservative 
players, and networks consisting of segregated components. 
The  surprising  result  here  is  the  existence  of  minimal  sufficient  networks  consisting  of 
heterogeneous cliques and/or networks putting more radical players at a lower hierarchical 
rank. These two types of networks exist for the same reason, namely that one needs to make a 
difference  between  a  player’s  own  exogenously  given  threshold,  and  the  endogenous 
threshold enforced on him by his social position in the network. Consider a  three-player 
game where player I has threshold 2, and where players II and III have thresholds 3. At first 
sight, it would seem that is suffices that player I finds out that player II is available for action. 
Yet, this does not guarantee that player II will effectively act, as player II himself needs to 
find out first that player III is available for action. Thus, player I will only be willing to act if 
player II and player III are linked to one another. Moreover, this does not suffice, as player II 
could also find out that player III is not available for action. Player 1 should therefore also 
find out whether player III is willing to act. While player I’s exogenous threshold is 2, the 
structure  of  the  social  network  has  modified  his  behavioral  threshold  into  3.  Similarly, 
consider a four-player game with one threshold-2 player and three threshold-3 players. Let the 
three threshold-3 players form a leading clique (meaning that they do not receive information 
from anyone outside of the clique). The threshold-2 player will not be content with finding 
out  that  one  of  the  threshold-3  players  is  in  principle  willing  to  act.  Knowing  that  this 
threshold-3 player only acts when he finds out that the two players in his clique are available 
for action, the threshold-2 player will want to find out whether these two other players are 
available as well. Effectively, the threshold-2 player behaves as a threshold-4 player, and thus 
effectively behaves more conservatively than the inherently more conservative players in the 
leading clique. This result may be seen as formalizing the sociological idea of embeddedness 
(Granovetter,  1985),  saying  that  one’s  position  in  a  network  has  an  influence  on  one’s 
behavior. 
On the negative side, the existence of a plethora of minimal sufficient networks shows that 
players face considerable strategic uncertainty. Which of these many types of networks should 
they coordinate on? Exactly because of the multiplicity of networks in each individual game, 
perhaps one type or at least a few types of minimal sufficient networks exist that work for all 
populations. In this case, such networks are bound to be focal, and the players would be able 
to resolve the problem of strategic uncertainty. Examples of such possible network types we 
                                                 
1 More correctly, in Chwe cliques can also overlap. Our simplifying assumptions exclude such cases.   3 
investigate are networks with everyone in one-player cliques; networks with all players with 
the same threshold in one and the same clique; and core-periphery networks with a large 
number of players in a leading clique and all other players around it in one-player follower 
cliques.  While  some  network  types  work  for  a  relatively  large  number  of  populations, 
unfortunately we are not able to find a network formation rule that works for all populations, 
thus  generalizing  Granovetter’s  intuition  that  minimal  sufficient  networks  are  population-
specific. 
 Our initial result of non-existence of generally applicable network formation rules is partly 
due  to  the  requirement  of  minimal  sufficiency  for  any  individual  population.  Trivially, 
eliminating the requirement of non-redundancy, players can always achieve collective action 
if they use the complete network in any population. We show that players can use less links 
than in the complete network, and thus still approach minimality, if they use a core-periphery 
network. Denoting as tmax the threshold of the most conservative player(s) in the population, 
the core-periphery network consists of a leading clique of any subset of tmax players from the 
population, and the rest of the players in one-player cliques depending on it. Put otherwise, it 
does not matter at all where players are positioned in the network. A core-periphery network 
thus works even for players who do not have any information about the population other than 
the  number  of  players  and  the  threshold  of  the  most  conservative  player(s).  The  core-
periphery network is still minimal sufficient for such uninformed players, in that within each 
set of populations with the same number of players and the same maximal threshold, a subset 
of populations exists for which the core-periphery network is minimal. This again is due to 
the  fact  that  players  in  our  game  can  form  endogenous  thresholds.  The  reason  the  core-
periphery  network  is  an  all-purpose  network  is  that  it  makes  players  form  the  same 
endogenous threshold (namely the threshold of the most conservative players), regardless of 
their own exogenously given threshold. 
The  use  of  a  core-periphery  network  to  solve  collective  action  problems  has  intuitive 
appeal. First, a leading clique is formed of a size large enough to bring a consensus among 
even the most conservative players about the desirability of action. Such a leading clique may 
be considered as a committee containing a representative sample of the population. Indeed, on 
average, the players in the committee are distributed in the same manner as the population. 
Second, all remaining players receive information that the committee has reached a consensus 
on when and where to act. Given that this committee is large enough to make even the most 
conservative player act, a message from this committee suffices to any player excluded from 
the committee. Players excluded from the committee do not additionally need to talk to each 
other. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 treats a modified version of Chwe’s (2000) 
model. Section 3 treats an example of a threshold game, and shows that on top of the type of 
examples of networks suggested by Chwe and Granovetter, a plethora of other networks may 
be  minimal  sufficient,  thus potentially  leading  to  a  large  amount of  strategic  uncertainty. 
Section 4 treats several types of networks, with the purpose of investigating whether there is a 
type of network that is minimal sufficient for all types of populations.  Section 5 treats a 
modified concept of minimal sufficiency, where minimality now means that a network is 
minimal for at least one population in the  class of populations with the same number of 
players and the same maximal threshold. It is shown that the core-periphery architecture is the 
unique network formation rule that allows players to achieve a minimal (in the new sense) 
sufficient network for each class of populations, as characterized by the number of players, 
and the maximal threshold). The paper ends with a conclusion in Section 6. 
 
 
   4 
2. Game-theoretical threshold model and minimal sufficient networks 
 
Let us attempt to construct in the simplest manner possible a game-theoretic version of the 
sociological threshold model. As collective action should be an equilibrium, we need a stag 
hunt game rather than a prisoner’s dilemma. In order for players to have different thresholds, 
this must somehow be reflected in their payoffs. We thus obtain a multi-player stag hunt game 
with heterogeneous players. The game is played by a finite set of players  { } n N ,..., 2 , 1 = . Each 
player has a threshold ti, with  max 2 t ti ≤ ≤ . We assume that  2 ≥ i t  so that each player is social, 
in needing action from at least one other player.  max t  is the highest threshold in the game, 
where we assume that  n t ≤ max , so that each player acts when all other players act. Each 
player  N i ∈ simultaneously chooses an action  { } s r ai , ∈ , where r is the risky action, which 
we will refer to as “action”, and s is the safe action, which we will refer to as “inaction”. A 
player who takes action s always obtains payoff zero, whatever his threshold. When taking 
action r, the payoff of a player i with threshold ti depends on i R− , i.e. the number of other 
players than i (denoted as –i) who take action r. When  ) 1 ( − < − i i t R , player i obtains payoff 
L −   when  doing  r,  where  L  is  a  large  loss.  When  ) 1 ( − ≥ − i i t R ,  player  i  obtains  payoff 
0 ) ( > −i R M  when doing r, with  0 ) ( ' > −i R M . This means that player i obtains a positive 
payoff as long as acting together with ti players or more, where this payoff is then larger the 
more players he acts together with.
2 All aspects of the game, including the players’ thresholds, 
are common knowledge.   
Any  such  stag  hunt  game  has  at  least  two  Nash  equilibria.  Given  that  n t ≤ max ,  an 
equilibrium exists where everyone acts. Given that nobody acts when nobody else acts, there 
is also an equilibrium where nobody acts. Let us now look at two examples. In example 1, the 
population consists of thresholds  ) 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 2 ( , in example 2, the population consist 
of thresholds  ) 10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 ( . Both examples have exactly two strict Nash equilibria, 
namely the ones identified above. Given the loss when acting with less players than one’s 
threshold, in both examples the efficient equilibrium is risk dominated (Harsanyi and Selten, 
1988). From a game-theoretic perspective, the two examples would thus seem very similar. 
Yet, from the perspective of the literature on threshold models (Granovetter, 1978; for an 
overview of recent literature, see Vanderschraaf, 2008), the two examples are very different. 
In example 1, if the two threshold-2 players both expect each other to act, this induces them to 
act. As soon as they are known to act, this suffices to create a chain reaction that makes 
everyone act: their action will trigger action by the threshold-3 player, who will again trigger 
action by the threshold-4 player, etc. In example 2, however, there is no subset of lower 
threshold players that would act without knowing whether the rest of the population acts. This 
is because, as can be checked, the maximal threshold in any subset is always larger than the 
number of players in the subset. The only manner for the players to achieve collective action 
in example 2 is for all of them to agree together to act. 
                                                 
2 This is contrast to stag hunt models of partner choice, where players are assumed to look for a sufficient 
number of cooperative partners in a population (Corbae and Duffy, 2007).   5 
Why are the two examples very similar in the game-theoretic model
3 and very different in 
the threshold model? In the threshold model, the assumption is that the threshold-2 players 
somehow assure one another that they will act. Either they communicate their intention to act 
to  the  threshold-3  player,  or  the  threshold-3  player  simply  observes  them  acting.  The 
threshold-3 player now acts as well. Again, he communicates this to the threshold-4 player, or 
this player observes the threshold-4 player acting. Etc. The structure of the communication 
network, or the order in which the players move, plays an essential role in this model. Yet, in 
the game-theoretic model treated so far, players make their decisions to act simultaneously. 
Moreover, communication does not make any difference in the game-theoretic model treated. 
To see why, suppose that players can communicate in a shared language to one another their 
intention to act, and suppose that the threshold-2 players in example 1, prior to choosing 
whether or not to act, communicate to one another their intention to act. The problem with 
this is that such a message is not credible, as one has a weak incentive to send such a message 
even when one is not planning to act (Aumann, 1990). Yet, experiments have shown that pre-
play communication leads to play of the efficient equilibrium in stag-hunt games (Cooper et. 
al., 1992). 
In game-theoretic terms, players communicating their intentions to act only makes sense if 
there are two types of players, namely players who do not intend to act, and players who 
possibly intend to act.
4 We could think here of players who are available for action, and 
players who are not available for action. Thus, in order to bring our model closer to being a 
game-theoretic  account  of  the  threshold  model,  we  need  to  turn  our  game  into  one  of 
asymmetric information. We assume that each player i, fully independently from his threshold 
ti, is with probability (1 – ε) in state w (available for action), and with probability ε in state x 
(not available for action). In state w, the player has the payoffs described above. In state x, the 
player again always obtains payoff 0 when not acting, but now always obtains payoff –L  
when acting. When each player is in state w, we have the stag hunt game treated above. The 
presence  of  the  state x  formalizes  the  individual player’s  doubts  about  whether  the other 
player will actually act. With probability ε, the individual player “goes crazy” and perceives 
his payoffs in such a way that inaction is a dominant strategy.
5 
Summarizing,  we  obtain  the  following  stag  hunt  with  asymmetric  information  and 
heterogeneous players. At stage 1, Nature determines for each player i a threshold ti, and a 
state w (probability (1 – ε)) or x (probability ε). The states occur with the same probability, 
whatever a player’s threshold.
6 The thresholds chosen by Nature are common knowledge, the 
state is not. At stage 2, communication takes place between players (see below). At stage 3, 
each player simultaneously decides to do action s or action r. At stage 4, each player obtains 
his payoff, as specified above. The game obtained differs from Chwe (2000) in the following 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the examples are still quite different if one induces learning dynamics. Suppose that the 
games are played repeatedly, and that players’ strategies are subject to noise. Then in example 1, starting from 
the inefficient equilibrium, if noise happens to make both threshold-2 players act, then they will both find out 
that this makes them better off, and will stick to this new strategy. As soon as this has happened, the threshold-3, 
threshold-4,  etc.  player  will  find  out  that  it  is  better  for  them  to  act.  In  example  2,  however,  the  efficient 
equilibrium is only learned if noise happens to make all players take action. But these learning dynamics then 
simply  replicate  the  communication  process  that  players  could  achieve  by  establishing  a  communication 
network. 
4 A similar game where asymmetric information is added to a stag hunt game in order to make communication 
relevant is the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The focus there is on noisy communication, and on how 
this leads players to require a large number of confirmations and reconfirmations from one another.  
5 In the context of reputation formation, Kreps and Wilson (1982) have similarly formalized a player’s doubts as 
uncertainty about the type of the other player, who is a “sane” player most of the time, but with small probability 
is a “crazy” player. 
6 It is plausible that ε is smaller the higher ti. Yet, as long as L is large, assuming different levels of ε has no 
effect on the results.   6 
sense. In Chwe, there are no additional states w and x, but players do not know each other’s 
thresholds.  Communication  thus  serves  to  find  out  each  other’s  thresholds,  and  not  each 
other’s availability for action (players are all available for action). Yet, at the same time Chwe 
studies networks that lead to successful collective action, which are assumed to be adapted to 
the  unknown  thresholds.  But  it  is  not  clear  how  players  can  coordinate  on  using  such 
threshold-dependent networks if nobody knows the others’ threshold before the network is 
formed. In our approach, we also treat how successful networks depend on the threshold 
distribution, but assume then that these thresholds are also known. Communication in our 
basic model concerns the players’ availability for action, but not their thresholds. Yet, the 
thresholds  play  an  indirect  role,  in  that  the  individual  player  can  only  count  on  e.g.  a 
threshold-5 player to act when being assured that the latter player found out from four other 
players that they are available for action. For this reason, the networks we obtain are similar 
to those obtained in Chwe. Nevertheless, in Section 5, we still treat an extension where the 
thresholds are also not common knowledge.  
As long as L is large, a necessary condition for a player with threshold ti to act involves 
receiving messages from at least  ) 1 ( − i t  other players signaling that they are in state w. It 
should be noted that an equilibrium without communication where no player acts continues to 
exist. Thus, our model does not solve the issue of equilibrium selection; it only ensures that, if 
the efficient equilibrium is played, this is conditional on communication having taken place.  
For  simplicity,  we  do  not  model  this  communication  strategically,  but  instead  study  the 
properties of communication networks that just still allow players to achieve collective action. 
These networks may be seen as assurance networks, establishing trust among the players that 
a  sufficient  number  of  players  is  in  state  w  and  that  their  individual  thresholds  will  be 
achieved. Concretely, we say that player i has a link with player j if gi,j = 1, and that player i 
has no link with player j if gi,j = 0. We consider the case where links correspond to one-way 
communication: gi,j = 1 enables agent j to access i’s information on whether i is in state w or x, 
but not vice-versa. Graphically, we denote gi,j = 1  as an arrow pointing from player i to player 
j: j is able to observe whether player i is in state w or in state x, so that player i’s type  is 
communicated to j. However, following Chwe, we assume that link gi,j = 1 does not give 
player j access to any information that player i may have about the type qh of a player h 
through a link gh,i = 1. In terms of the network literature, this may be  seen as a case of 
information decay (Bala and Goyal, 2000): as the distance in the network increases, the value 
of  information  decreases  –  which  takes  place  here  in  an  extreme  way.  Another  way  to 
formulate this assumption is to say that links cannot aggregate information; any player can 
only communicate whether his own state is w or x, not what he finds out about other players’ 
states, or what other players have found out about other players’ states. A typical set of all 
player i’s links and non-links is denoted as gi, where  ( ) n i i i i i i i g g g g g , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,..., , ,..., + − = . Define as 
a network, g, a set of sets gi for each player i, thus  ( ) n g g g ,..., 1 = . We focus on networks that 
allow all players to act. If the population is such that there are also equilibria where only a 
few players act, this is justified in terms of the preferences of any player in state w, who is 
better off the more other players act. 
 
Definition 1. Define as a sufficient network, any network that allows for an equilibrium where 
all players act when all players are in state w. 
 
But  a  trivial  sufficient  network  is  then simply  the  complete  network,  where  all players 
observe each other’s types w or x. While we do not model network formation as strategic, we 
can still impose plausible restrictions on networks, which are likely to arise upon strategic 
network formation. Given the large L, no player will want to run any risk, and will thus   7 
always  require  at  least  the  minimal  number  of  messages  assuring  that  his  threshold  is 
achieved. By increasing the number of messages attended to above this minimal number, the 
player can increase the probability of collective action. Yet, the more links a player attends to, 
the more costs he will incur. For simplicity, we assume that these costs are always so high that 
the  player  prefers  to  pay  attention  to  the  minimal  number  of  messages  assuring  that  he 
achieves his threshold. For this reason, we focus on networks where each player considers 
each message as crucial. As soon as he does not receive a crucial message, he does not act and 
obtains payoff zero. 
 
Definition  2.  Define  as  a  minimal  sufficient  network  g  (henceforth  msn),  any  sufficient 
network  with  the  following  property.  Consider  any  subset  of  players  ' N ,  and  denote  by 
g gN ⊆ '  the set of links received by these players. The property now is that as soon as any 
subset of links in  ' N g   is deleted, given the newly obtained communication network, not all 
agents in the set X, with X =  ' N , act. 
 
Our concept of minimality differs from the one of Chwe (2000), in that in Chwe, X is equal 
to  N  as  a  whole  rather  than  to  ' N .  Chwe’s  concept  of  minimality  is  that  any  sufficient 
network g is minimal sufficient as long as there does not exist a network  ' g  connecting all 
workers, with  g g ⊂ ' , that allows all players to act, and thus also allows for an equilibrium 
with  collective  action  of  all  players.  Chwe’s  concept  thus  sees  a  network  as  unstable  if 
deletion of messages can lead to a new network that is also sufficient. In our concept of 
minimality, which lies closer to the network literature, any sufficient network g is minimal 
sufficient  as  long  as  there  does  not  exist  a  subset  of  players  ' N ,  receiving  a  subset  of 
messages  ' N g  of g, who still act when receiving less messages than in  ' N g . Thus, in our 
concept  of  minimality,  any  subset  of  players  ' N   should  consider  the  messages  currently 
received as crucial. The fact that deletion of messages from  ' N g  may lead players in the set 
N\ ' N  not to act, and therefore does not lead to a new equilibrium with collective action, is not 
taken into account in our criterion of minimality. Given our modified concept of minimality, 
and given that information is local, it is easy to show that each msn takes the form of a 
hierarchy of cliques. We do this by introducing some more definitions, and by proving some 
intermediate lemmata. 
 
Definition 3. We say that there is a path from i to j in g if there exist agents j1,…,jm such that 
1 ... , , , 2 1 1 = = = = j j j j j i m g g g . 
 
Lemma 1. Under local knowledge (A2), if a path  1 ... , , , , 1 2 1 1 = = = = =
− j j j j j j j i m m g g g g  exists 
in  a  msn,  given  (A2),  it  must  also  the  case  in  this  msn  that 
1 ... , , , , , 1 2 1 = = = = = =
− j j j j j j j j j i m m g g g g g . 
Proof: Given that information is local, player j only finds out the state of player jm. Given that 
player jm sends a message to player j, it must be that the information that jm is in state w is 
crucial to player j. But, given the structure of the msn, player j knows that player jm only acts 
when finding out that player   1 − m j  is in state w. For this reason, player j also wants to find out 
whether player  1 − m j  is in state w. Moreover, player j knows that player  1 − m j  similarly will 
only act when receiving information that player  2 − m j  is in state w. For this reason, player j 
also wants to find out whether player  2 − m j  is in state w. Etc. 
   8 
Definition 4. Define as a cycle any path  1 ... , , , 2 1 1 = = = = i j j j j i m g g g . 
 
Definition 5. Define as a clique a set of players j1, j2,…, such that for all jm, jn in this set of 
players, we have  1 , , = =
m n n m j j j j g g . 
 
Corollary 1. If a msn contains a cycle, then all the players in this cycle are in one and the 
same clique. 
Proof: This follows from the fact that there is path between any two players in a cycle, and 
from Lemma 1. 
 
Corollary 1 is the natural consequence of the assumption that information is local. If it is 
crucial to player j to receive a message from player i, then player j only acts when knowing 
that player i will act. But, knowing the network structure, in which player i only acts when 
receiving a certain number of messages, and given that information is local, player j will only 
act when also receiving all messages that player i wants to receive. Moreover, as i reasons in a 
similar manner about messages that the players sending to him receive, player j also wants to 
receive these messages. Etc. Corollary 2 now shows that this implies that cliques in a msn 
cannot overlap. This is contrary to Chwe (2000), whose different concept of minimality does 
allow for overlapping cliques. An example is treated after the proof. 
 
Corollary 2. Msns can only contain two cliques that share players if these players are together 
in a single clique. 
Proof: When two cliques share players, this means that there is a cycle involving all players in 
these two cliques. But then, by Corollary 1, they must be in a single clique. 
 
We further show that, for two separate cliques A and B, if a player i in clique A talks to a 
player j in a separate clique B, then no player h in clique B can talk to any player k in clique A, 
and that if one player in clique A talks to one player in clique B, then all players in clique A 
must talk to all players in clique B. 
 
Lemma 2. Consider two separate cliques in a msn, denoted as clique A and clique B. If a 
player i from clique A talks to a player j from clique B, then no player k from clique B can talk 
to any player h from clique A. 
Proof: Suppose that a player i from clique A talks to a player j from clique B, and that a player 
k form clique B talks to a player h from clique A. Given that in each clique, all players talk to 
each other, there is then a cycle encompassing all players in A and B. But then by Corollary 1, 
all players in A and B should be in one and the same clique, a contradiction. 
 
Lemma 3. Consider two separate cliques in a msn, denoted as clique A and clique B. If a 
player i from clique A talks to a player j from clique B, then all players from clique A should 
talk to all players from clique B. In short, we then say that clique A talks to clique B. 
Proof: This follows directly from the fact that the presence of one link between the cliques 
implies that there is a path between any pair of players divided over the cliques. 
 
THEOREM 1. Any msn for an individual population state takes the form of a partition of the 
players in cliques, where any two cliques may talk to one another in only one direction, and 
where there are no cycles among cliques. 
Proof: By Corollary 1, any players contained in a cycle of links must be in one and the same 
clique. By Lemmata 2 and 3, any two cliques can only talk to one another in one direction,   9 
where one clique talking to another means that all players in the former clique talk to all 
players in the latter clique. These “talking to” relations between cliques may not form cycles, 
since otherwise the players in these cycles cannot be in separate cliques. 
 
Since by Theorem I there cannot be cycles among the cliques, any msn must contain at least 
one leading clique, characterized by the fact that players in the clique do not receive any 
messages from players outside of the clique, and at least one end clique, characterized by the 
fact that players in the clique do not send any messages to players outside of the clique. 
Moreover, any msn can be seen as a set of chains of cliques, where a chain of cliques is any 
path in a msn between a leading clique and an end clique in the network (where a link from 
clique A to clique B on such a path means that all players in clique A talk to all players in 
clique B). In every chain of cliques, all links between cliques point from the leading clique to 
the end clique. We add the following definition.    
 
Definition 6. Define as a player’s rank in a clique chain the number of cliques from which his 
clique receives information in this particular clique chain, plus one. 
 
Thus, the players in the leading clique of a clique chain have rank 1 (the highest rank) in this 
clique chain, the players along this clique chain receiving messages from the leading clique 
have rank 2 (the one-but highest rank), etc. Following Chwe, cliques can be interpreted as 
social roles (instigators, immediate followers of the instigators, etc.), and any msn can be 
interpreted as a hierarchy of social roles. 
A first intuition for why msns must take the form of a hierarchy of cliques is provided for 
the simple case in Figure 1, in which players I, II, III and IV all have threshold 3, and all 
know each other’s thresholds. An arrow denotes message(s) sent in one direction, whereas a 
line denotes messages sent in both directions. In Figure 1a, suppose that player I receives a 
message from players II and III, and sends a message to both these players. Suppose now that 
I finds out that II and III are in state w. This does not mean that II and III will act; given their 
thresholds, they will only act if they hear from two other players that they are in state w. Thus, 
I will only act if II and III also talk to one another. We then obtain a clique of three players as 
indicated in Figure 1b, where we always draw a circle around the players in who are in the 
same clique. How about IV? Does it suffice that e.g. II and III tell him that they are in state w 
(indicated by arrows in Figure 1c)? It does not, because IV knows that, given the network 
structure, II and III only act if they find out from I that she is in state w. So, IV must receive a 
message from each player in the three-player clique, as indicated in Figure 1d. Effectively, we 
thus  have  a  three-player  clique  talking  to  a  one  player  clique.  Figure  2  gives  a  simpler 
representation of the msn in Figure 1d.  A line within a clique now denotes that people talk to 
each other; an arrow from one clique to an other clique denotes that everyone in the former 
clique talks to everyone in the latter clique. 
 
 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
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Figure 2 Notation for communication between cliques 
 
 
We next treat two networks for the same example that are sufficient, but not minimal. 
Figure 3 represents the complete network. Suppose that, as the case in the complete network, 
players II, III and IV require three messages that other players are in state w before they are 
willing to act. Then it is a best response for player I to also require three messages. Given the 
symmetry of the example, this means that requiring three messages is then a best response to 
every player. Yet, the entire set of players should jointly realize that they can still coordinate 
on collective action if IV does not send messages to I, II and III, and if I, II and III content 
themselves  with  messages  among  themselves  that  they  are  all  in  state  w.  This  argument 
follows both Chwe’s (2000) concept of mininality, in that a subnetwork can be found that is 
also minimal, and our concept of minimality, in that one can find a subgroup of players, 




Figure 3 Complete network: sufficient, but not minimal 
 
Consider next the network in Figure 4 consisting of two overlapping cliques. I and IV now 
each  require  messages  from  both  II  and  III  that  they  are  in  state  w,  but  do  not  require 
messages  from  one  another.  II  and  III  require  such  a  message  from  one  another,  and 
additionally a message from either I or IV (they cannot require a message from both I and IV, 
since otherwise I and IV will also want to know of one another). In Chwe (2000), this network 
is minimal, since one cannot delete links and move to a new sufficient network, allowing for 
collective action. In our modified version of minimality, this network is non-minimal, as II 
and III would still act with only a message from I but not from IV, and thus can decide not to 
pay attention to this message in the first place. However, given that IV sees that II and III do 
not pay attention to his messages anymore, IV is no longer assured that II and III act, as he 
does not know whether II and III found out that I is in state w. It follows that IV does not act. 
Summarizing, Chwe calls a network non-minimal if you can make a smaller subnetwork that 
is still sufficient. We call a network non-minimal if one or more players do not have any 
incentive to pay attention to all signals, and this independent of the fact whether we still have 
a sufficient network after these players stop paying attention to messages. 
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A second intuition underlying Theorem I can be explained by means of Figure 5. Suppose 
that cliques Mw, Mx, My and Mz are in the same clique chain. As indicated by the straight 
arrows, what we would expect this to mean is that clique Mw sends messages to Mx, Mx to My, 
and My to Mz. However, when Mx sends messages to My, My only finds out the states of the 
players in Mx, but not the states they themselves have observed the players in Mw to have. Yet, 
My knows that Mx relies on the players in Mw being in state w. Therefore, My must also get 
messages from Mw. Similarly, it does not suffice that Mz gets messages from My. Mz knows 
that My wants to receives messages from Mx, and by the reasoning above, also from Mw. 
Therefore, Mz also needs to receive messages from Mx and from Mw. In what follows, contrary 
to what is the case in Figure 5, in order not to clutter our figures, we will omit the links that a 
clique receives from higher-ranked cliques along a chain. 
 
Figure 5. Chain of cliques 
 
While in the example of Figures 1 to 4, there is only a single msn, typically any given 
threshold game has a plethora of msn. This is what we now show in the next section. 
 
 
3. Multiplicity of minimal sufficient networks, and existence of endogenous thresholds 
 
 Consider  the  18-player  threshold  game  10 , 10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 7 , 6 , 6 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 4 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 2 , 2 Γ ,  where  the  numbers 
denote the players’ thresholds. Then an example of a msn in the spirit of Chwe (2000) is 
provided in Figure 6. This example has several characteristics that raise the question whether 
they are general. First, several of the players are in multi-player cliques. The consequence of 
this is that putting one additional player in state w does not necessarily mean that one more 
player will act. Instead, it is often the case that several players in the same clique all need to 
be in state w to get additional players to act. Put otherwise, a critical mass of players in state w 
each time needs to be achieved to get more players to act. Second, each individual clique is 
perfectly homogeneous, in that each clique consists of players with an identical threshold. 
Indeed, it seems intuitive that similar players would play similar social roles. Third, players 
are at a lower rank in the hierarchy the more conservative they are. It seems intuitive that 
there would be a one-to-one relationship between the player’s threshold and his rank in a 
chain of cliques. Fourth, the minimal sufficient network is connected, in that it connects all 
players in a single network. Fifth, the minimal sufficient network is quite hierarchical, as 
some players are at rank 4. The example is natural in view of Chwe’s interpretation of a msn 
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Figure 6. Homogeneous cliques 
 
Yet, as we now point out, this game has many more msns, where each of the characteristics 
of the example in Figure 6 are violated (it should be noted that this multiplicity is not obtained 
because of our modifications to Chwe’s model, but is equally present in Chwe’s original 
model). First, as shown in Figure 7, this game has a msn that consists almost exclusively of 
one-player cliques, and contains players positioned at rank  9 ) 1 ( max = − t . In this case, starting 
from the situation where a number of individual players act, it takes only one extra player in 
state  w  to  get  extra  players  to  act.  Second,  this  game  has  minimal  sufficient  networks 
containing multi-player cliques that are heterogeneous, in that cliques contain players with 
different thresholds. An extreme case of this is shown in Figure 8, where the leading clique 
has  a  maximal  level  of  heterogeneity,  in  that  players  of  every  possible  threshold  are 
represented in it. Third, the game has minimal sufficient networks where players with a lower 
threshold (more radical players) are at a lower rank in a chain of cliques than players with a 
higher  threshold,  meaning  that  more  radical  players  may  only  act  depending  on  more 
conservative players acting. An extreme case of this is shown in Figure 9, where the players 
in the one-player follower cliques systematically have a threshold lower than or equal to the 
thresholds of the players in the large leading clique. Fourth, minimal sufficient networks exist 
that  consist  of  three  segregated  components,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  10.
7  Fifth,  minimal 
sufficient networks exist that consist of only two hierarchical ranks, namely a leader rank and 
a follower rank. This is already illustrated by Figures 8 and 9. 
 
                                                 
7 It is clear that each msn should contain at least one component containing tmax = 10 players. By putting all the 
highest threshold players in such a 10-player component, one increases the chances that the remaining players 
are able to achieve collective action among themselves without any connection to the 10-player component. To 
the rest of the population, one can now apply the same procedure. The maximal threshold in the rest of the 
population is 5, so that there must be at least one 5-player component, which we again fill up with the most 
conservative players. One final self-sufficient three-player component can then finally be constructed. 
2 
2 
10  10 
10 
3 
3  3 
6 
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Figure 10 Segregated network 
 
 
The  most  surprising  elements  in  these  examples  are  the  existence  of  msns  containing 
heterogeneous cliques, and the existence of msns where players are at a lower rank in a chain 
of cliques than players who are inherently more conservative than them. Both phenomena can 
be explained by the fact that a player’s exogenously given threshold ti may be smaller than his 
endogenous threshold determined by his rank and/or social role in the hierarchy. The concept 
of a player’s endogenous threshold is formally defined in Definition 7. 
 
Definition 7. For any minimal sufficient network, define as the endogenous threshold  x t ~ of 
player x the number of players he needs messages from before he acts. Note that  x x t t ≥ ~ , and 
that it may be that  x x t t > ~ .  
 
As  an  example  of  a  heterogeneous  clique,  consider  the  four-player  leading  clique  with 
endogenous thresholds (3, 3, 4, 4) in Figure 10. Consider one of the threshold-3 players. Let a 
wearing a red hat
8 mean that one is of type w (say, available to revolt against the government). 
Why does our threshold-3 player not content himself with receiving information that two 
other players of the clique wear a red hat? Suppose that our player would observe this. Then 
at least one of the two players that he observes wearing a red hat has threshold 4, meaning that 
this threshold-4 player only acts when seeing three other players wearing a red hat as well. It 
follows that our threshold-3 player is only assured that at least two players in the clique act 
when knowing that the threshold-4 player knows that three players in the clique beside him 
wear a red hat, meaning that the threshold-3 player himself will only act when three players 
beside himself wear a red hat. Our threshold-3 player thus forms an endogenous threshold of 
4. 
In  fact,  the  four-player  clique  in  Figure  10  could  equally  well  consist  of  players  with 
exogenously given thresholds (2, 3, 4, 4). Consider the threshold-2 player in such a clique. 
Suppose that he would only observe one other player beside himself wearing a red hat. At 
best, this other player has threshold 3. But then, this threshold-3 player must see two players 
wearing a red hat. Any such set of two other players that the threshold-3 player will observe 
will contain at least one threshold-4 player, who must see all players in the clique wearing a 
red hat. Thus, the threshold-3 player will form endogenous threshold 4. Knowing this, the 
                                                 
8 The reference to red hats is taken from the well-known red-hat riddle that is often used to illustrate the effect of 
common knowledge (Geanakoplos, 1982). The formation of endogenous thresholds, where each player becomes 
as conservative as the most conservative player in his clique, resembles the contagion models that are found in 
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threshold-2 player  will  form  endogenous  threshold  4  as  well, because  any  player  that he 
observes has endogenous threshold 4.  Proposition 1 derives a general result for the threshold 
distribution that any individual clique in a msn may have. 
 
Proposition 1. Consider any clique with x players in a msn, where  1 > x . Let w be the number 
of messages that each member of the clique receives from players in other cliques. Consider 
any integer y, with  x y < ≤ 1 . Then: 
(i)  the clique with x players should not contain more than  ) 1 ( − y  players with threshold 
) ( y w+  or lower; 
(ii)  the clique with x players should contain at least two players with threshold  ) ( x w+ , and 
no players with a threshold higher than  ) ( x w+ ; 
(iii)  the clique with x players having maximal heterogeneity is one with a single player of 
threshold  y  for  each  integer  [ ] ) 1 ( ), 2 ( − + + ∈ x w w y ,  and  with  two  threshold-
) ( x w+ players. 
Proof: 
(i) If a clique with more than one player contains a threshold- ) 1 ( + w player, then this player 
does not need messages from the other players in his clique. If a clique with more than two 
players contains two players with threshold  ) 1 ( + w  or  ) 2 ( + w , then these two players only 
need to receive information from each other, not from other players in the clique. If a clique 
with  more  than  three  players  contains  three  players  with  threshold  ) 1 ( + w ,  ) 2 ( + w   or 
) 3 ( + w , these players only need messages from one another. Etc. 
(ii) By (i), the clique of x players should not contain more than  ) 2 ( − x  players with threshold 
) 1 ( − + x w  or lower. Thus,  ) 1 ( − x  players with threshold  ) 1 ( − + x w  or lower is not allowed. 
It  follows that there should be at least two player  with threshold  ) ( x w+  or higher.  But 
players with threshold higher than  ) ( x w+  do not have enough information to act. It follows 
that the clique should contain at least two players with threshold  ) ( x w+ . 
(iii) By (i), there can be at most one threshold- ) 2 ( + w  player. If there is a threshold- ) 2 ( + w  
player, there can be at most one threshold- ) 3 ( + w  player. If there is one threshold- ) 2 ( + w  
player and one threshold- ) 3 ( + w player, there can be at most one threshold- ) 4 ( + w  player. 
Etc. By (ii), there must be at least two threshold- ) ( x w+ players. QED 
 
Proposition  1  can  be  used  to  show  that,  while  cliques  may  have  players  who  are 
heterogeneous  in  their  exogenously  given  thresholds,  they  all  have  the  same  endogenous 
thresholds. Thus, while a msn may consist of cliques that are heterogeneous in exogenous 
thresholds, they are homogeneous in endogenous thresholds. 
 
Corollary 3. In any clique of a msn clique with x players receiving w message from outside 
the clique, every player has the same endogenous threshold  ) ( x w+ . 
Proof: By Proposition 1, such a clique has at least two players with endogenous threshold 
) ( x w+ . Moreover, the clique has at least three players with threshold  ) 1 ( − + x w  or higher. 
Consider  three  players  with  the  highest  thresholds  in  the  clique,  and  let  there  be  one 
threshold- ) 1 ( − + x w  player among these. Then this player needs to receive messages from at 
least  ) 2 ( − x  players in the clique. But this will include a message from at least one threshold-
) ( x w+ . It follows that the player needs to receive  ) 1 ( − x  messages, and forms endogenous 
threshold  ) ( x w+ .  Next,  note  that  the  clique  has  at  least  four  players  with  threshold   16 
) 2 ( − + x w  or higher. Consider four players with the highest thresholds in the clique. Then 
again, it can be checked that these will form endogenous threshold  ) ( x w+ . Etc. 
 
As an extreme example of a player ranked at lower rank than a more conservative player, 
consider  a threshold-2 player in one of the one-player follower cliques in Figure 9. This 
player, who is inherently one of the most radical in the population is at a lower rank in the 
population  than  the  most  conservative players  in  the population,  namely  the  threshold-10 
players. Because the leading clique is heterogeneous, in fact all players in the leading clique 
form endogenous threshold 10. In the red hat example, each player in the leading clique only 
acts when seeing 9 other players in the leading clique wearing a red hat. Because of this fact, 
observing  a single player in the leading clique wearing a  red hat does not suffice to our 
threshold-2 player. Knowing that this player only acts when observing 9 other players in the 
leading clique wearing a red hat, the threshold-2 player will only act when seeing all 10 
players  in  the  leading  clique  wearing  red  hats,  so  that  the  threshold-2  player  forms  an 
endogenous threshold of 11. It follows that one of our inherently most radical players behaves 
like a player that is more conservative than one of the inherently most conservative players in 
the population.  In  general, such a phenomenon  is only possible for players in one-player 
cliques; also, any followers of our threshold-2 player cannot have lower exogenous threshold 
than him, since under local knowledge they in any case require messages from the leading 
clique as well, which suffice to them. These results are formally shown in Proposition 2.  
 
 
Proposition 2. Consider three cliques directly linked in a single chain, Mx ￿ My ￿ Mz. x, y 
and z denote the number of players in these cliques. Denote by  x t ~  the endogenous threshold of 
each player in clique Mx, and by w the number of messages received by each player in clique 
Mx from other cliques. Clique My can contain a player with exogenous threshold  x y t t ~ ≤  if: 
(i)  1 = y ; 
(ii)  1 + > w ty ; 
(iii)  the threshold of any player in clique Mz is larger than  y t . 
Proof: 
To show (i), note that a typical player in clique Mx is willing to act because she finds out that 
at least  x t ~  people are willing to act (which includes herself). The players in My receive the 
same information, but are supposed to have a lower exogenous threshold. It follows that an 
individual player in My does not need any extra messages, and must therefore be in a one-
player  clique.  To  show  (ii),  note  that  the  unique  player  in  clique  My  must  obtain  all  w 
messages  that  the  players  in  clique  Mx  receive  from  other  cliques.  If  1 + ≤ w ty ,  this 
information suffices, and the player does not need information from clique Mx itself. (iii) 
follows from the fact that the players in clique Mz also must receive messages from all players 
in clique Mx (see Figure 5). If their thresholds are lower than those of the players in My, they 
do not additionally need messages from the players in My. QED 
 
 
Proposition  2  should  be  seen  as  an  exception  to  a  rule:  the  “natural”  order  of  players 
according to their thresholds can only be broken for two consecutive ranks, but not for three 
consecutive ranks. The reason of the reversal in Figure 7 is that there are so few ranks in the 
first place. General results about the relation between a player’s exogenously given threshold 
and his rank in a msn are given in Proposition 3, which puts both higher and lower bounds on 
the rank at which a player of given threshold can be located.   17 
 
 
Proposition 3. Denote the ranking of cliques in an individual chain by the numbers 1, 2, …, 
) 2 ( − z ,  ) 1 ( − z , z, where  ) 1 ( max − ≤ t z . The following rules apply for the manner in which 
cliques are ordered along individual chains. 
(i)  In any individual chain, a threshold-2 player can be located at rank 1 or 2. A player i with 
exogenously given threshold ti > 2 is located at rank r, with  ) 1 ( − ≤ i t r ; 
(ii) In any individual chain with highest rank z, threshold- tmax player can be located at rank z 
or  ) 1 ( − z .  For  1 ≥ y ,  a  player  with  threshold  ) ( max y t −   is  located  at  rank  r,  with 
) ( y z r − ≥ . 
Proof: 
(i)  Note  first  that  any  threshold-2  player  can  only  be  in  a  leading  clique  (rank  1),  or 
immediately  following  a  leading  clique  (rank  2);  no  higher  rank  is  possible  as  the 
threshold-2 player would then receive sufficient information from the leading clique 
already. Consider next players with threshold higher than 2. Each such player receives 
messages from all players higher up in the hierarchy along a clique chain. Also, as any 
exogenous threshold is at least 2, each leading clique (rank 1) contains at least two 
players; each clique of lower rank contains at least one player. It follows that a player i 
at rank r with threshold ti receives messages from at least r players, at least one for each 
rank ρ such that  ) 1 ( 2 − ≤ ≤ r ρ , and at least two messages from players at rank 1. It 
follows that  1 + ≥ r ti , or  ) 1 ( − ≤ i t r . 
(ii)  A player with threshold tmax cannot be located at rank x with  ) 2 ( − ≤ z x : otherwise, the 
players at rank z do not need links to the players at rank  ) 1 ( − z . A player with threshold 
) ( max y t −  cannot be located at rank r, with  ) ( y z r − < . Otherwise, the player in the 
clique  at  rank z,  who has  at  most  threshold tmax, does  not  need  any  messages  from 
players at rank  ) 1 ( − z . 
QED 
 
The  existence  of  msns  with  endogenous  thresholds  does  not  contradict  Chwe’s 
interpretation of hierarchies of cliques as hierarchies of social roles. The only correction is 
that a player’s social role may be quite different from his exogenously given threshold. A 
player with leader capacities (= a low exogenous threshold) may be a follower, a player with 
few inherent capacities for leadership (= high exogenous threshold) may be a leader (even 
though there must then be many leaders). Very different players may play one and the same 
role, and very similar players may play very different roles. This is because of the discrepancy 
between the players’ inherent tendencies, and the behavior forced upon them by their network 
environment.  Thus,  our  model  allows  for  the  effect  of  embeddedness  in  a  network  on  a 
player’s  behavior  (Granovetter,  1985).  It  is  not  only  the  case  that  players’  individual 
behavioral  tendencies  determine  how  they  are positioned  in  a  social  hierarchy;  the social 
hierarchy itself also determines how they behave. 
Why are there so many msn? We now show some general results. A first insight that can be 
obtained that each msn of a particular n-player threshold game with maximal threshold tmax 
must contain at least one component connecting exactly tmax players. For instance, all msn in 
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Lemma 4. Consider any n-player threshold game with maximal threshold tmax. Then any msn 
contains at least one component connecting exactly tmax players. 
Proof:  Any  tmax-threshold  player  must  receive  messages  from  at  least  ) 1 ( max − t   different 
players.  It  follows  that  any  msn  must  contain  at  least  one  component  of  tmax  connected 
players.   
 
A second insight is that, for any subset of players containing at least one tmax-threshold 
player, one can find a minimal sufficient component. 
 
Lemma  5.  For  any  subset  of  tmax  players  containing  at  least  one  tmax-threshold  player,  a 
connected minimal sufficient component exists. 
Proof:  For  any  set  of  tmax  players  containing  at  least  one  tmax-threshold  player,  one  can 
construct  a  connected  minimal  sufficient  component  by  the  following  network  formation 
algorithm. In Step 1, build as many leading cliques of size 2 as possible (containing threshold 
(2, 2)). Next, among the remaining players, build as many leading cliques of size 3 as possible 
((3, 3, 3) or (3, 3, 2)). After that, build among the remaining players as many leading cliques 
of size 4 as possible ((4, 4, 4, 4) or (4, 4, 4, 3), (4, 4, 3, 3), or (4, 4, 3, 2)), etc. Continue this 
procedure until it is not possible anymore to build leading cliques. Note that application of 
Step 1 may lead  all tmax players to be put in  a single clique.  In Step  2, if there  are any 
remaining players, connect as many of them as possible in follower cliques of size 1 to one or 
more of the leading cliques (a threshold-2 player connected to a two-player leading clique, a 
threshold-3 player connected to a two- or three-player leading clique; a threshold-4 player to 
one three-player leading clique or two two-player leading cliques, etc.). After this, among the 
remaining players connect as many follower cliques of size 2 to one or more of the leading 
cliques. Continue this procedure until it is no longer possible to connect players to the leading 
cliques. In Step 3, if any players remain, connect as many as possible one-player cliques to 
one or more of the follower cliques. Next two-player cliques. Etc. Continue these steps until 
all players have been allocated. Note that this procedure necessarily results in a connected 
component, as the tmax player needs to receive messages from all other players. 
 
A third insight is that one can always connect the players not included in any subset as 
defined in Lemma 5 to a minimal sufficient component as defined in Lemma 5. 
 
Lemma 6. Consider any tmax-player connected minimal sufficient component containing at 
least  one  tmax-threshold  player.  Then  any  remaining  players  in  the  population  can  be 
connected to this component in one-player follower cliques. 
Proof: Any minimal sufficient component as defined in Lemma 5 consists of a partition of ten 
players  in  cliques  according  to  endogenously-formed  thresholds.  Denote  the  set  of 
endogenous thresholds contained as (x1, x2,…, xi,…, xz). For any player not included in the 
minimal sufficient component with exogenously given threshold tj, look for the smallest xi in 
the set (x1, x2,…, xi,…, xz) such that tj ≥ (xi – 1). Then the tj-threshold player can be connected 
in  a  one-player  follower  clique  to  the  clique  of  the  minimal  sufficient  component  with 
endogenous threshold xi. QED 
 
In order to see the plethora of msns, note first that there is a plethora of subsets containing at 
least  one  threshold-10  player  that  can  be  formed  in  game  10 , 10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 7 , 6 , 6 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 4 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 2 , 2 Γ .  By 
Lemmata 4 to 6, one can form a different msn for each of these subsets, by following the 
procedure set out in Lemmata 5 to 6. Yet, often one can even form other minimal sufficient 
components for any subset of 10 players containing at least one threshold-10 players. And   19 
there are often several ways to connect the remaining players to such a minimal sufficient 
component. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 8, cases exist where one can form segregated 
components with the remaining players.  
Concluding this section, there typically is a plethora of msn, causing the players a large 
amount of strategic uncertainty.  Yet, if we see players as repeatedly playing in threshold 
games, where the population may each time differ, then this plethora of equilibria can be seen 
as an opportunity rather than as a threat. As shown by Granovetter (1978), some msns stop 
being  minimal  sufficient  even  for  small  changes  in  the  population.  Yet,  because  of  the 
plethora of msn for any typical game, perhaps there are other msns, or at least msns with 
certain characteristics, that work no matter how the threshold in the population changes, i.e. 
that work for all populations. Such all-purpose msns may then be focal, and the problem of 
strategic uncertainty is then resolved. The next section investigates whether such generally 
applicable msns exist. 
 
 
4. Generalizability of network formation rules 
 
The purpose  of  this  section  is  to  investigate  whether  we  can  find, across  all  allowable 
populations of players of our game, msns that have a certain common feature. If such msns 
with a common feature exist, this common feature may become focal and solve the strategic 
uncertainty arising from the multiplicity of msn. The common feature itself may then be seen 
as a rule for successful network formation. We consecutively consider the following network 
formation rules. A first rule we treat (Section 3.1) corresponds to Granovetter’s bandwagons 
(1978), and consists of putting as many players as possible in one-player cliques, and of 
giving each player a rank bearing a one-to-one relationship to his order in the ranking of 
exogenously given thresholds. A second rule (Section 3.2) treated corresponds to one of the 
main examples provided by Chwe (2000) and consists of putting all players with the same 
exogenous threshold together in one and the same homogeneous clique. A third rule (Section 
3.3)  consists  of  constructing  a  core-periphery  network,  with  a  number  of  players  in  the 
leading clique equal to the largest threshold in the population, and the rest of the players in 





Definition 8. Define as a bandwagon a network where all players are in one-player cliques, 
with the exception of two threshold-2 players, who are in a two-player leading clique. 
 
In  sociological  terms,  a  bandwagon  is  almost  exclusively  characterized  by  weak  links 
between players (Granovetter, 1973), where a link between player i and j and a link between 
player j and k does not normally means that player i and k are linked. With the exception of 
the leading clique, there are no multi-player cliques in which strong links are formed. 
Proposition 4 shows that a bandwagon exists as long as there are at least two threshold-2 
players, and as long as for any player i with threshold ti, there are at least (ti – 1) players with 
a threshold smaller than his. Put otherwise, if there is a player with a threshold ti higher than 
2, there must be at least (ti – 1) more radical players who act without receiving information 
from this player. A bandwagon thus exists if any subset of 2, 3, 4,..., (tmax – 1) players can be 
made to act independently. The population is therefore relatively radical, as the most radical 
players  act  with  little  assurance  that  others  act.  As  the  most  radical  players  have  the 
leadership, in that nobody acts unless they act, they must also be self-sufficient.   20 
 
Proposition 4. A bandwagon exists if there are at least two threshold-2 players, and for each 
threshold-x player with x > 2 at least (x – 1) players with threshold lower than x. 
Proof: 
If there are less than two threshold-2 players, any msn automatically contains a leading clique 
with at least three players. Furthermore, in order for any threshold-3 player not to require 
being in a multi-player clique, there must be at least two threshold-2 players from which he 
can receive individual messages. For any threshold-4 not to require being in a multi-player 
clique, there must be at least three players with threshold 3 or lower from which he can 
receive individual messages. Etc. QED 
 
The  simplest  case  of  a  bandwagon  is  where  there  are  no  gaps  between  the  players 
thresholds,  as  depicted  in  the  example  in  Figure  5. Note  that  if there  are  more  than two 
threshold-2 players, the remainder can still be linked in one-player cliques to the leading 
clique of two threshold-2 players; these followers than form endogenous threshold 3. It should 
also be noted that a bandwagon exists even if there are gaps between the thresholds, in which 
case the bandwagon contains “loops” and does not have a tree structure. 
A bandwagon may be considered as a simple network formation rule. First, order all players 
according to their thresholds. Then, let each player receive the necessary number of messages 
from more radical players. Unfortunately, bandwagons do not exist for all populations. We 
illustrate this by means of two 10-player games, which are exceptional in that only a single 
msn may exist. For instance, in game  10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 2 Γ  the bandwagon is the only msn. But in 
game  10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 Γ , a bandwagon does not exist, and the only msn is the antipode of the 
bandwagon, consisting of a single clique containing all players.  
 
 
4.2 Homogeneous cliques 
 
Definition  9.  Define  as  a  homogeneous  msn  where  all  players  with  the  same  exogenous 
threshold are in one and the same clique. 
 
The idea is that all players of the same type play exactly the same social role. This may be 
seen as reflecting the often made observation in sociology of homophily in networks: similar 
players  tend  to  link  to  one  another  (see  McPherson,  Smith  Lovin  and  Cook,  2001).  The 
similar players form strong links with one another (if i is linked to j and j is linked to k, then i 
and k also tend to be linked), and are connected with dissimilar players only through weak 
links. 
 
Proposition 5. A homogeneous msn exists if for each x players with threshold t 
(i)  if these players are in a leading clique, it is the case that x = t. 
(ii)  if these players are in a follower clique, it is the case that x < (t – 1). 
(iii)  if these players  are in a follower  clique, there  must be exactly  ) ( x t −  players with 
thresholds lower than t who can be put in homogeneous cliques. 
Proof: 
(i)  A leading clique acts without receipt of any incoming messages. As all players must be 
in homogeneous cliques, it any leading clique it must be the case that x = t. 
(ii)  Threshold-t players can be in a clique of at most t players. It there are more than t 
players, it is not possible for all of them to be in the same clique. If there are (t – 1) 
threshold-t players in a follower clique, then these players must receive information   21 
from a single player. This player must be in a one-player clique. As each clique receives 
messages from all cliques higher up in a chain, this one-player clique can itself not be a 
follower clique.  But no player in the considered populations can be in a one-player 
leading clique. 
(iii)  The  y  threshold-t  players  only  act  when  receiving  information  from  exactly  ) ( x t −  
players outside their clique, who must themselves be in homogeneous cliques. QED 
 
Homogeneous msn apply only to particular populations. As any msn has at least one leading 
clique,  there  must be  at  least  one  threshold  level t  for  which  there  are  exactly t players. 
Moreover, the number of players of a certain threshold puts restrictions on the rest of the 
population.  For  instance,  if  there  are  four  threshold-6 players,  there  must be  exactly  two 
threshold-2 players. If there are three threshold-6 players, then either there must be exactly 
three  threshold-3  players,  or  exactly  two  threshold-2  players  and  exactly  one  threshold-3 
player.  If  there  are  two  threshold-6  players,  then  there  must  be  exactly  four  threshold-4 
players,  or  exactly  two  threshold-2  players  and  exactly  two  threshold-4  players.  For  the 
exceptional case where there are exactly ten players, one can find examples where the only 
msn is homogeneous, e.g.  10 , 10 , 8 , 8 , 6 , 6 , 4 , 4 , 2 , 2 Γ . Yet, in game  10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 Γ , the only msn contains 
a single perfectly heterogeneous multi-player. Game  10 , 10 , 8 , 8 , 6 , 6 , 4 , 4 , 2 , 2 Γ  conveniently has gaps 
between the players’ thresholds, but such gaps are not a necessary condition for the existence 
of a homogenous msn. As illustrated in Figure 4, by having multiple chains of cliques in a 





After studying two network formation rules inspired on examples from the literature, we 
now turn to a third network formation rule. We have already noted in Lemma 5 that any 
network contains at least one minimal sufficient component consisting of exactly tmax players 
and containing at least one tmax-threshold player. By Lemma 6, a msn can always be found by 
constructing  a  single  such  tmax-player  minimal  sufficient  component,  and  connecting  any 
remaining players to it in one-player follower cliques. The problem now is that, for any subset 
of tmax players, many minimal sufficient components may exist, again inducing different ways 
to link the remaining players in one-player cliques, such that the problem of multiplicity is not 
solved. This is why we study the case where the tmax-player minimal sufficient component 
takes a particular form, in being complete.  
 
Definition 10. Define as a core-periphery msn any msn with tmax players in a single complete 
leading clique, and all other players in one-player follower cliques around it. 
 
In a core-periphery network, we have a single leading clique with strong links, which has 
weak links with singleton cliques outside of the leading clique. 
 
Proposition 7.  
The following condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a core-periphery msn. 
Let there exist at least one subset  ' N  with  N N ⊆ '  consisting of a number of  tmax  players (i, 
j,…, w, y, z), ordered in ascending order according to the levels of their thresholds, and with 
the following characteristics. Player i has threshold ti  ≥ 2, player j has threshold tj  ≥ 3,…, 
player w has threshold tw  ≥ (tmax – 1), and players y and z both have thresholds tmax. 
Proof:   22 
This result follows directly from Propositions 1 and 3. 
 
Again, sticking to the exceptional case of games where there are exactly tmax players, it is 
easy to construct examples where core-periphery is not a msn, such as   10 , 10 , 8 , 8 , 6 , 6 , 4 , 4 , 2 , 2 Γ  (only 
homogeneous cliques) and  10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 2 Γ  (only bandwagon). Thus, unfortunately, the core-
periphery is not generally applicable either. Whereas the bandwagon is a msn for relatively 
radical populations, where instigators need few messages from other players, one can say that 
core-periphery is  a msn  for  relative  conservative populations.  For  instance,  if  there is no 
option but to fill any tmax-player core with more than two threshold-2 players, then the core-
periphery is not a msn. The leading clique must contain at least a few of the most conservative 
players; these infect the rest of the population, making their endogenous thresholds equal to 
the exogenous threshold of the most conservative players. Collective action only takes place if 
everybody agrees that collective action is worth a while. 
Rounding up this section, we conclude that none of the treated network formation rules 
allow for the formation of a similar msn for each possible threshold game, and a solution to 
the problem of strategic uncertainty is thus not found. Yet there are important differences 
between  the  several  network  formation  rules  treated.  The  reason  why  a  bandwagon  or  a 
homogenous clique network are not minimal sufficient for all possible populations is that they 
are not sufficient for all populations. The existence of a bandwagon msn crucially relies on 
there being at least two threshold-2 players. While the bandwagon is sufficient  for  game 
10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 2 Γ ,  it  is  not  for  game  10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 Γ .  In  our  main  example 
10 , 10 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7 , 7 , 6 , 6 , 6 , 5 , 4 , 4 , 3 , 3 , 3 , 2 , 2 Γ , if one of the threshold-3 player’s threshold is turned into 4, a msn 
where all players with the same thresholds are in the same homogenous cliques, so that the 
three threshold-4 players are in a leading clique, is no longer sufficient. 
The reason why the core-periphery network is not always a msn, however, is because it is 
not always minimal. The core-periphery network is always sufficient. Any player positioned 
anywhere in a core-periphery always knows that nine other players are willing to act. This 
fact  yields  an  additional  advantage  to  core-periphery  networks.  If  players  are  willing  to 
compromise on the fact that core-periphery networks are not always minimal (even though 
they are minimal as well quite often), then it does not matter who is positioned where in the 
network. In order to achieve the bandwagon, or a network with homogenous cliques, players 
need to coordinate on who is positioned where in the network. Unsophisticated players may 
find such coordination difficult. Core-periphery networks on the contrary are sufficient even if 
players are put at random places in the network. The next section formalizes the idea of 
unsophisticated players in treating a modified game where players additionally do not know 
each other’s thresholds. 
 
 
6. Players do not know each other’s thresholds 
 
In this section, we treat a modified game where players only know that they are playing an 
n-player  threshold  game  where  any  player’s  maximal  threshold  is  tmax,  and  their  own 
threshold,  but  not  other  players  thresholds.  In  particular,  for  each  n  and  tmax,  there  is  a 
distribution  of  possible  populations,  and  this  distribution  is  common  knowledge.  The 
populations that occur with positive probability include a population where all other players 
have threshold tmax. The assumption is taken to capture the notion that players may find it 
difficult  to  adapt  the  network  architecture,  and  the  position  of  individual  players  in  this 
architecture, to the details of the population. Such players then act as if they do not know 
other  players’  thresholds.  We  continue  to  assume  that,  separately  from  their  thresholds,   23 
players  may  be  either  in  state w  or  x.  Otherwise,  a Nash  equilibrium  would  exist  where 
players take collective action even in the absence of communication. We continue to assume 
that a link gi,j = 1 enables agent j to access i’s information on whether i is in state w or x. We 
now assume that such a link does not allow player j to find out player i’s threshold. 
In the modified game without common knowledge of thresholds, the concept of minimality 
is  now  modified  in  the  following  manner.  A  sufficient  network  is  now  minimal  if  it  is 
sufficient in the sense of Definition 2 for at least one population in the set of populations with 
n players and maximal threshold tmax. It is easy to see now that for large enough L, the core-
periphery network is a msn in this sense in the modified game, and can thus be seen as being a 
msn for any game. To see why, note that it continues to be the case that each msn must 
contain at least one component consisting of tmax players. Moreover, given each individual 
player’s uncertainty about the other players’ thresholds, this component can only be complete. 
Each individual player in this component, even when having only threshold 2, considers the 
possibility that all other players have threshold tmax, and develops endogenous threshold tmax. 
The players not included in the leading clique similarly develop endogenous thresholds of 
) 1 ( max + t . They only need messages from the players in the leading clique, so that they are 
automatically in one-player cliques. An exception is the case where n ≥ 2tmax, in which case 
multiple complete components can be formed. However, this is not possible for populations 
where n < 2tmax. Thus, the unique msn consists of putting a random sample of tmax players in a 
complete leading clique (core), and to put all other players in one-player follower cliques of 
this leading clique (periphery). 
The  mechanism  by  which  the  core-periphery  network  is  generally  applicable  is  that  it 
changes  each  player’s  endogenous  threshold  in  such  a  way  that  he  acts  like  the  most 
conservative player in the game. Typically, the leading clique is heterogeneous in exogenous 
thresholds. The standard argument for heterophily in networks (e.g. Reagans and Zuckerman, 
2001)  is  that  heterophily  in  networks  promotes  innovation,  because  of  a  wider  range  of 
opinions. In the present model, heterophily is called for because it is leads to networks that are 
generally applicable. 
The proposed core-periphery network as a general recipe to achieve collective action in the 
threshold game has intuitive appeal. First, a representative committee is randomly selected 
from the population. Indeed, on average, the committee is distributed in the same manner as 
the  entire  population.  Also,  the  committee  is  large  enough  to  convince  even  the  most 
conservative player to act. Thus, the purpose of the committee is to achieve consensus about 
the desirability of collective action. Second, once the representative committee has achieved 
consensus that collective action is desirable, this is communicated to each other member of 
the population individually. Given that the committee is large enough, the other players will 
be convinced to take action, whatever their degree of conservatism. All players form a large 
endogenous threshold, and for this reason it does not matter at all who is positioned where in 
the core-periphery architecture. Such an architecture thus provides an easy manner for the 
players to coordinate on collective action. More broadly speaking, the core-periphery network 
can be seen as a common-knowledge generating institution (Chwe, 2001; for an overview of 
such  institutions,  see  Koessler,  2000).  The  committee  can  be  interpreted  as  a  common-
knowledge  generating  institution  that  allows  a  minimum  of  common  knowledge  to  be 
achieved to assure collective action. The fact that tmax players simultaneously meet makes it 
common  knowledge  among  them  that  tmax  players  are  available  to  action.  Once  such 
information has been generated, it is communicated to the rest of the population, which does 
not need further communication.    
 
 




Among the plethora of networks that allow for collective action, the core-periphery network 
provides an easy manner for players to coordinate on collective action, whatever the details of 
the population. Yet, several issues remain to be investigated. First, we have neglected the cost 
of forming links. Because of size of the leading clique and the fact that it is complete, many 
links are needed in the core-periphery network, and the bandwagon is more economic in this 
sense (even though it needs to be stressed that each player still needs to receive a message 
from each player higher up in a clique chain as well). Second, one could envisage noise in the 
links, where with small probability information a player’s information does not get through to 
others.  In  this  case,  the  players  make  themselves  vulnerable  in  the  core-periphery.  The 
information of a single player in the core not getting through suffices to disable all collective 
action. The more players there are in the core, the more likely this is to happen. The big core 
of the core-periphery network puts up a high hurdle that needs to be crossed before any 
collective action takes place. In a bandwagon, however, the probability that messages get lost 
in the smaller leading clique is relatively small, so that it is likely that at least some players 
get to act. Third, it may be that a strategic player tries to disrupt collective action, e.g. by 
eliminating one player and doing this with the maximal possible disruptive effect. Given the 
examples of strikes, revolutions and riots, this is plausible. Consider for instance the game 
2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 Γ . In the core-periphery network, one leading clique of two players is formed, 
with  the  eight  remaining  players  around  it  in  one-player  cliques.  An  alternative  (but  not 
generally  applicable)  segregated  network  has  five  segregated  components  of  two  players. 
Consider a strategic adversary of the network whose purpose it is to disrupt the network, and 
who can do this by eliminating any one player. In the core-periphery network, by eliminating 
one of the players in the leading clique, the disruptor can make sure that no player acts. In the 
segregated  network,  the  number  of  acting  players  can  only  be  reduced  to  eight.  If  some 
players  acting  is  better  than  no  players  acting,  the  segregated  network,  consisting  of 
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